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Abstract: The only perspective through which eighteenth-century British histories of
Ancient Greece have been studied is their attitude towards monarchy and democracy.
Because these texts collectively depicted monarchy as the ideal type of government
and democracy as the worst, scholars have labelled them simply as pro-Spartan and
anti-Athenian. Nevertheless, ancient history-writing was then a practice aiming at pro-
viding insights into as many contemporary political topics as possible and Ancient
Greek history-writing was no exception. The question of empire appears to be a prob-
lem that equally preoccupied the historians. In that sense, the eighteenth-century Brit-
ish histories of Ancient Greece serve as an alternative source for arriving at the
contemporary understanding of empire in Britain. Furthermore, the tone of the histori-
ans’ arguments, which was very much determined by the theme selected, was far from
always pro-Spartan. Within the context of empire, Athens was presented as the model
to be emulated.
Introduction
The writing of Ancient Greek history in eighteenth-century Britain has not,
except for a few scattered treatments, received much attention from histori-
ans owing to the poor quality of scholarship that these texts contain when
compared to the masterly level attained in the following century by George
Grote and Connop Thirlwall. Also, because contemporary English and
Roman histories, such as Hume’s History of England and obviously Gib-
bon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, enjoyed more fame and suc-
cess than the histories of Ancient Greece, studies of eighteenth-century
British historiography have considered them to represent a discipline not yet
fully formed. Nevertheless, the work of eighteenth-century British histori-
ans on Ancient Greek history has not gone completely unnoticed and has
been briefly assessed in chapters, or parts of chapters, and in books devoted
to larger topics such as historiography and neo-classicism.3 Additionally,
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IMPERIAL LESSONS FROM ATHENS AND SPARTA 643
there are a few articles that have shown a limited interest in some of these
texts, but these have done no more than help perpetuate the conviction that
the texts contain only pro-Spartan arguments to defend and uphold a monar-
chical system of government.4
Existing analyses of these histories have been confined to this single vantage
point, namely that the historians favoured Sparta on the grounds of its being a
monarchy and employed the examples of Athens to exhibit the evils of
democracy. Nevertheless, grounded in the belief that ancient history offered
universal rules for establishing balance and enduring order under varying
political circumstances, these histories of Ancient Greece cover a wide range
of topics, from party politics to elections, from ideal governance to the con-
duct of empire. Rather than always favouring Sparta over Athens, the assess-
ment changes according to the topic selected. Therefore it is not appropriate to
concentrate on only a single aspect of these histories and to classify them as
simply pro-monarchical and therefore pro-Spartan. This study seeks to show
that when eighteenth-century historians of Britain turned to the topic of
empire, it was Athens, not Sparta that came to the fore as a model for the Brit-
ish political nation to emulate.
The eighteenth century in Britain witnessed a great increase in the number
of histories of Ancient Greece and Rome, since the neo-classicism of this
period drew its utmost inspiration from the common belief in its own utility
for better analysing and understanding the British past and present by means
of ancient examples. As James William Johnson asserts: ‘Neo-classicism was
thoroughly empirical. And it was unashamedly utilitarian.’5 This belief in the
utility of ancient history was based on the supposed completeness and general
applicability of an ancient world within which one could have a comprehen-
sive picture of events; including all causes and effects, major and minor. It
was believed that antiquity depicted a kind of dynamic cycle, through which
civilizations rose and fell. It was first the states of antiquity that experienced
this cycle of ‘birth, growth, maturation, decline and death’, but all nations were
subject to it. They would follow the same historical patterns and inevitably
meet the same end, which was irrecoverable degeneration.
For British statesmen and those who wrote for them, one of the ways to pre-
vent or at least delay this degeneration and to preserve stability was the
meticulous examination of ancient history. Ancient history was seen as full of
political lessons and would teach the nation to follow the footsteps of the
4 P. Cartledge, ‘Ancient Greeks and Modern Britons’, History Today, 44 (1994),
pp. 286–317; K. Demetriou, ‘In Defence of the British Constitution: Theoretical Impli-
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Political Thought, XVII (1996), pp. 280–97; and A.W. Saxonhouse, ‘Athenian Democ-
racy: Modern Mythmakers and Ancient Theorists’, PS: Political Science and Politics, 26
(1993), pp. 486–90.
5 J.W. Johnson, ‘What was Neo-Classicism?’, Journal of British Studies, 9 (1969),









































ancients to greatness and to avoid the mistakes that caused their fall. If histo-
ries of Rome were more common and more prominent, these motivations
applied no less to the writing of Ancient Greek history. As Eric Nelson
argues, the legacy of Ancient Greece had exercised a considerable influence
on republican thought in England since as early as the sixteenth century.6
When the search for answers from antiquity to the question of empire became
fashionable in the eighteenth century on the other hand, it was primarily to
Roman history that writers turned. Still, Ancient Greece served as an impor-
tant supplementary source for the attempts by the British to model ideals of
empire.
Although the texts about Ancient Greek history, written and read in
eighteenth-century Britain, when judged by current criteria, contain insuffi-
cient, sometimes inaccurate historical information, they nonetheless provide
useful insight into how some topical political issues were discussed, includ-
ing not only the question of forms of government but also the question of
empire. Having projected the Ancient Greek experience onto political chal-
lenges also troubling contemporary British statesmen, the historians aimed at
fulfilling their share of the duty to guide the political nation through turbulent
times.
The interdependence of history and politics in the eighteenth century is
well established. As Lord Bolingbroke stated in his arte historica, history
was meant to teach the reader ‘a general system of ethics and politics on the
surest foundations, on the trial of these principals and rules in all ages, and on
the confirmation of them by universal experience’.7 No eighteenth-century
historical work, in this sense, was free of politics. Not uncommonly, the his-
torical truth was somewhat twisted or overstated in order to fit it into one or
more ongoing political debates so as to underpin the argument of one side of
the debates. In spite of the increasing interest in archaeological findings
through which the ancient past could be reconstructed as it really was,
Ancient Greek history-writing of the eighteenth century should be evaluated
against this rather elastic political background.
The Greek states were understood and introduced as tools to transmit cer-
tain political messages to the British reader. In contrast to the question of
forms of government, with reference to the notion of empire Athens stood for
the quintessential example of the ideal. In history-writing in general the ideal,
though derived from the same historical sources, varied according to the
political views of the historians. In terms of writing Ancient Greek history,
the ideals of the historians did not vary much, because almost all the texts
considered here reflected, either explicitly or implicitly, a Tory viewpoint.
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IMPERIAL LESSONS FROM ATHENS AND SPARTA 645
The eighteenth century was a time when, as Kathleen Wilson argues, the
‘empire mattered’, even ‘to ordinary people’.8 It would be wrong to suggest
that British statesmen had not already begun to seek for an ideal imperial gov-
ernance prior to and concurrently with the publication of these history texts.
What the British historians did was to contribute to this quest for ideal im-
perial governance by favouring the Athenian model. Sparta, on the other
hand, was assessed in the same light as the undesirable models of empires of
the eighteenth-century, namely France and Spain. David Armitage contends
that the British empire
deploys resources from a wider tradition of political thought, stretching
back to classical sources in Ancient Greece and, especially, Rome, but also
encompassing contemporary Spain and the United Provinces, as a part of a
wider European dialogue within which the various empires were defined
and defended.9
I would argue that Ancient Greek history was accepted, though not as pre-
dominantly as the history of Rome, as a viable source for the eighteenth-
century quest for an ideal empire. It was employed to comprehend not only
discussion of the empire of Britain, but also of the empires of other European
states. In my framework, however, I would replace ‘the United Provinces’
with ‘France’ in the above statement of Armitage and add ‘contested’ to
‘defended’.
Historians
The Ancient Greek historiography of eighteenth-century Britain has been
neglected to the degree that none of the existing works mentioned so far
provides anything like a complete list of these history texts. In addition, the
analyses which have focused only on the texts’ monarchical tone, somewhat
monotonously refer to and reiterate the same words of the same historians,
John Gillies and William Mitford. The works of Gillies and Mitford are the
most renowned examples of the genre, but definitely not the only ones. Hence
I would like to take into consideration a more complete list, including works
by two Irish historians which were also read in Britain, and which might be
considered here to fall into the same category of ‘British historians’. Chrono-
logically first are the works of John Potter (1673/4–1747), afterwards
Archbishop of Canterbury, and the rather obscure Thomas Hind. At a time
when Greek history was not yet a matter of general interest, Potter’s book,
Archaeologia Graeca (1697) was received with considerable enthusiasm,
whereas Hind managed only to have the first volume of his History of Greece
8 K. Wilson, The Island Race: Englishness, Empire and Gender in the Eighteenth
Century (London and New York, 2003), p. 15.










































(1707) published. All Greek histories that appeared subsequent to Potter’s
history in some way aimed at superseding his work and developing the parts
left unclear by him.10
Concurrent with Hind, Temple Stanyan (1676/7–1752), who was the first
Englishman to write a complete history of Ancient Greece in the eighteenth
century, published his Grecian History in 1707. The second edition of this
work in 1739 appeared to be the forerunner of many subsequent Greek
histories published in the second half of the century. Until the arrival of the
histories by Gillies and Mitford, Stanyan dominated the field, despite his
shortcomings in terms of methodology. Although this history has been fre-
quently labelled ‘pro-Spartan’, because its author, in an unhidden dislike of
democracy, argued against Athens, he equally distanced himself from Sparta
as ‘too limited’ a monarchy.11 However, when it came to lessons on managing
an empire, as discussed further below, Stanyan derived them mostly from
Athens. Before the publication of other general history texts, a particular his-
tory drawn from Ancient Greece, The History of the Life and Reign of Philip,
King of Macedon, was published by the Irish clergyman and historian Thomas
Leland (1722–85) in 1758. Leland’s concluding remark on Philip of Mac-
edon, ‘[i]f he was unjust, he was like Caesar, unjust for the sake of empire’,12
ended up as one of the most cited and controversial quotations in those years.
Leland’s Philip also reflected a highly positive view of Athens.
Returning to more general histories, the Greek history of Oliver Goldsmith,
whose Roman and English histories actually became more popular, was pub-
lished posthumously in 1785. His Grecian History was also abridged for the
use of schools in 1787. Nevertheless, despite his wide audience, charming
style and claim to offer a better Greek history, Goldsmith’s attempts at writing
histories, including this one, only gained him a justified reputation as a great
hack-writer.13 Goldsmith’s history was overshadowed by that of William
Mitford (1744–1827), which was the most monarchical and Tory-oriented
history yet published. In fact, the notable success of Mitford’s five-volume his-
tory was alone responsible for the labelling of eighteenth-century Ancient
Greek historiography as anti-Athenian and pro-monarchical. Apart from the
first volume published in 1784, Mitford’s Greek history was preoccupied
with the French Revolution. It attempted to associate the events of Ancient
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IMPERIAL LESSONS FROM ATHENS AND SPARTA 647
Athens with those of eighteenth-century France. By citing examples from
Athens, Mitford condemned democracy as a curse to moral government, as
also seen in revolutionary France, and enthusiastically idealized Sparta at the
expense of Athens. Thus, having become entangled with exhibiting the evils
of democracy, he sacrificed his ideal of writing good history and desire of
‘avoiding equally negligence and tediousness’.14 On these grounds, I shall
only take into consideration the first volume of this work.
Two years after the appearance of the first volume of Mitford’s work, John
Gillies (1714–1836), later the Royal Historiographer for Scotland, succeed-
ing William Robertson in this post, published his Greek history in two vol-
umes in 1786. In his own words, Gillies sought to write a ‘perpetual unbroken
narrative’ that would ‘promote the great purposes of pleasure and utility’.15
Similar to Mitford, Gillies too brought his political concerns into his history
and transmitted his message in the form of an anti-Athenian argument. How-
ever, in his quest for ideal empire-building, his messages became signifi-
cantly pro-Athenian. The last Greek history of the era came from an Irish
historian John Gast (b. 1715) who was then the Archdeacon of Glendalough.
This work was actually a new version of his previously published Rudiments
of Grecian History (1753), which was written in the uncommon form of a dia-
logue. Despite his efforts, Gast could not compete with the reputation of
Mitford and Gillies, and his history remained largely neglected even in his
lifetime.
It was not only to the above authors that Ancient Greek history appealed.
Others in the eighteenth century saw the relevance of this considerable source
of data for contemporary political topics. Walter Moyle (1672–1721) and
E.W. Montagu (1713–76), for instance, produced texts that included partial
accounts of Ancient Greek history.16 Moyle, a Whig politician, published a
long essay in praise of the virtues of Sparta, in terms of its excellent legal prac-
tices as an empire, achieving ‘balance in property, power and dominion’.17
Montagu, on the other hand, the son of Wortley Montagu and a Whig at least
by upbringing, purportedly wrote a pamphlet with the aim of proving the
resemblance between contemporary Britain and the free republics of antiquity.
In this venture, Athens was much commended as ‘a strong contrast’ to Sparta,
though here the focus was more on political system than on empire.18 These
two authors, however, did not intend to assume the task of writing a more
14 Mitford, History of Greece, I, Preface.
15 J. Gillies, The History of Ancient Greece, Its Colonies and Conquests from the Ear-
liest Accounts till the Division of the Macedonia Empire in East (London, 1786), I, p. vi.
16 See also Sir William Young, The Spirit of Athens (London, 1777).
17 W. Moyle, ‘An Essay on the Lacedemonian Government’ (1698), in The Whole
Works of Walter Moyle that were Published by Himself (London, 1727), p. 50.










































complete and better history than the existing ones, but rather, in Montagu’s
words, sought ‘to examine the evidence arising from ancient history’.19 In this
study, therefore, the multiple-volume works explicitly intended as histories
will be the principal focus.
These British historians were collectively concerned with the topic of
empire along with other political issues, particularly with the best ways to
build and preserve an empire. Although, excepting Mitford, they did not
exhibit an explicit commitment to a Tory standpoint, they presented two kinds
of empire, one desirable and the other undesirable, in a fashion greatly resem-
bling Tory political discourse on contemporary imperial affairs. Just as the
Tories opposed the constant engagement in a land war, the historians criti-
cally approached the military attitude of a Spartan empire that insatiably
sought new opportunities for war on land. Also, the historians’ appreciation
of the commercial maritime empire of Athens was in harmony with a Tory
understanding of an empire that was to be preserved and furthered through the
implementation of a ‘Blue Water’ strategy.
The publication of some of these texts may not coincide with the days when
Tory opposition ideas were most fervently expressed. Nevertheless, these
views evolved through a long period of time before they were fully formu-
lated and they endured as political traditions long after they had been over-
taken by other items on the immediate political agenda. While treating the
topic of empire, in addition to the contemporary Tory political tradition, the
historians also turned to certain notions that deeply concerned the thinkers of
the Scottish Enlightenment. These historians were not solely involved in party
discourse, but rather a blend of parliamentary politics with extra-parliamentary
discussions of the ‘ideal’ through reflections on politics, society and civiliza-
tion. In this sense, the historians joined the discussion over empire with refer-
ence to the contemporary problematic of commercial versus military means in
their works. Parallel to the emphasis on the virtue of commerce in the quest
for the advancement of nations by the thinkers of Scottish Enlightenment, the
historians, having despised the militaristic attitude of the Spartan empire, pre-
sented the commercial activities of the Athenian empire as the correct practice
to be adopted by the British in their imperial venture.
The notion of balance of power also resonated in the texts of ancient Greek
history.20 However, in essence the aim in elaborating this concept was not to
agree with the Whig standpoint. The idea of the balance of power was rather
approached through an emphasis on the fact that Ancient Greece consisted of
similarly formed and governed states and therefore resembled a civilization
not inherently different from modern Europe. The idealized version of Greece
648 C.A. ATAÇ
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IMPERIAL LESSONS FROM ATHENS AND SPARTA 649
depicted a ‘really united body, happy in itself and formidable to its enemies’.21
The secret of this Greek solidarity was seemingly embedded in the balance of
power preserved among the major Greek states. The historians’ therefore
stressed the innate similarity of these states which would facilitate the bal-
ance, rather than the differences which would destroy it. All in all, Ancient
Greece as a whole represented to the eighteenth century a civilization of high
refinement and reflected the way the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment
understood modern Europe.
Ancient Greece as Europe
Having unequivocally recommended the subject of their histories to the politi-
cal nation, the historians implied that Ancient Greece resembled contempo-
rary Europe in many ways. Therefore, the former’s history was apt as a guide
to the eighteenth-century British audience in their attempts to understand the
European civilization to which they belonged, their relationship with other
European states, as well as lessons about empire. Ancient Greece promoted
the spirit of liberty, the stand against despotism, a single civilization shared by
similarly sovereign states, and of course the rules for preserving the balance
of power among these states. Uniquely gifted with the spirit of liberty, the
Ancient Greeks gloriously stood up against any attempts, both internal and
external, to impose despotism, particularly those of the Persian kings, and
remained immune to all ‘the inflexible rigour of despotism’.22 The first and
foremost reason why the Ancient Greeks had never known despotic govern-
ment and remained free was given as the existence of the Amphictyonic
Council.23 In the eyes of the historians, the Greeks thus distinguished them-
selves from the eastern nations, at least until their surrender to the Ottomans.
With the exception of Mitford’s association of Athens with Ottoman despot-
ism in the volumes of his history published subsequent to the French Revolu-
tion, the Ancient Greek histories of eighteenth-century Britain generally
highlighted the non-despotic character of the Greek states as one of the pillars
on which Greek civilization rose to refinement. That the political and property
rights of Greek citizens were enshrined in justly designed legal codes was par-
ticularly praiseworthy.
Despite their rivalry for supremacy, the petty states of ancient Greece
always maintained similar understandings of civic rights as different cultiva-
tors of one and the same civilization. In this way, Ancient Greece reflected the
way Europe was contemporarily perceived by the thinkers of the Scottish
Enlightenment in their theories of civilization and progress. To them, Europe
consisted of similarly sovereign states in which individuality and liberty
21 Leland, Life and Reign of Philip, I, p.xxxvii.
22 Gillies, History of Ancient Greece, I, p. 11, n. 35.









































could flourish. Despite their differences, the states of Europe, as Adam Fer-
guson contended in his An Essay on the History of Civil Society, constituted a
‘happy system of policy’ which ‘does honour to mankind’.24 The historian
Leland’s approach to the Greek empire was noteworthy in this sense. While
pointing out the varying characteristics of the Greek states, he also underlined
the essential common feature that separated them from the barbarians dwell-
ing beyond their eastern border, ‘an ardour for liberty, and a strict regard to
the public good’.25 The neighbouring Greek states developed the sense of
belonging to a wider community than their own, since they stood ‘all united
and connected together by interest and affection’. What emerged from this
common affiliation was, as Leland maintained, ‘a similar species of civility’
solidly committed to the Greek laws and commonwealth.26 Thus was built the
parallel between Ancient Greece and contemporary Europe and so was
proven the suitability of Ancient Greek history as a guidebook that pinpointed
and magnified those experiences that coincided with the affairs of contempo-
rary Europe. This affinity also indicated the viability of studying the Greek
states individually, in addition to collectively, so as to enlighten the British
reader on varying political topics.
Empire: Commercial versus Militaristic
To Gast, Ancient Greece acted as ‘a moral governor over human things’.
Under such rule ‘a people, in their beginnings mean and inconsiderable,
advanced by virtue and wisdom to the greatest height of empire’.27 Clearly,
sharing the same civilization would not necessarily indicate that the states
representing the Greek examples of empire peacefully coexisted without any
major clash, nor that they unanimously agreed to implement identical poli-
cies. On the issue of empire, the Greek states, especially Sparta and Athens, of
particular interest to this study, pursued contradictory designs. Within this
context, with its modest scale, an emancipating legal structure, non-military
means of empire-building such as widespread commerce, and finally its naval
strength, the Athenian empire, except under Pericles, seemed to bear undeni-
able similarities to the commonly held British view of an ideal empire in the
eighteenth century. As an antithesis of this ideal, the imperial practice of
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IMPERIAL LESSONS FROM ATHENS AND SPARTA 651
Sparta, on the other hand, was grounded in belligerent policies aiming at an
unwise territorial expansionism. In that sense, Sparta appears in our texts as
the chief model of an undesirable kind of empire, equivalent to the contemporary
Spanish and French empires. On the matter of empire, the accomplishments of
Athens overshadowed those of Sparta. According to the generally held
eighteenth-century British view, Spain and France, along with their aggressive
policies pursued at the expense of ‘the general tranquillity of Europe’,28 car-
ried out unwise imperial designs beyond Europe. These designs rendered
them undesirable models of empire for the British political nation.
The unpleasant consequences of the Spanish imperial venture were widely
asserted and the general conviction was that the Spanish overseas enterprise,
initiated supposedly to enrich the motherland, had in fact exhausted its finan-
cial and human resources. As one anonymous pamphlet suggested, Spain
failed to transform its imperial assets into a profitable investment, as its gov-
ernors ‘[i]nstead of considering the West Indies as an estate they were to
improve and receive an annual profit always from’, hastily ‘squandered’ this
vast territory. Regarding the rise and fall of the Spanish empire, the British
saw repeated the lesson drawn from empires that had fallen previously. In order
to reduce the cost and sustain the profitability of imperial designs, the mother-
land ought delicately to attach the colonies to itself through the civilizing and
mutually enriching ties of commerce. According to the same pamphlet:
[i]f the Spaniards, as soon as they had acquired such extensive dominion in
the new world, had diligently applied to the cultivation of trade and manu-
facture, it would necessarily have given them the supreme direction of the
affairs of Europe.29
France, on the other hand, which seemed to share the same ‘spirit of indus-
try and enterprise’30 as Britain, was not completely ignorant of the crucial role
to be played by commerce in the proper growth of empires. The French
empire was ‘commercial’ in character.31 Nevertheless, the overseas rise of
France followed an aggressive pattern of expansion and menaced Britain both
in North America and Europe. Due to its authoritarian and warlike policies,
the Bourbon scheme of empire was a lesson for the British that they ‘ought to
use every method to repress them [the French] to prevent them from extend-
ing their territories, their trade or their influence’.32 The French transferred to
28 D. Hume, ‘Of the Balance of Power’, in Essays Moral, Political and Literary in
Two Volumes, ed. T.H. Green and T.H. Grose (London, 1882), I, p. 354.
29 A Description of the Spanish Islands and Settlements on the Coast of the West
Indies, compiled from Authentic Memoirs (London, 2nd edn., 1774), pp. xvii–xviii.
30 W. Burke, An Account of the European Settlements in America in Two Volumes
(London, 1757), II, p. 16.
31 D. Hancock, ‘ “World of Business to Do”: William Freeman and the Foundation of
England’s Commercial Empire’, William and Mary Quarterly, 57 (2000), pp. 3–34, p. 4.









































their military designs all the revenue generated from trade with their colonies,
building an empire aggressively but exhausting its profits.
Emphasizing the same points that contemporary political pamphlets stressed
as the features of undesirable models of empire in the shape of Spain and
France, the British historians of Ancient Greece demonstrated to their readers
how the Spartan imperial enterprise had brought territorial gains but had
failed to endure. Therefore, the Spartan example did not represent a viable
option for the process of empire-building. Antiquity suggested that an empire
that overstretched its territory and that chased incessantly after the prospects
of war would not last. Spain and France were the reflections of this political
lesson on the eighteenth century. The Athenian experience, on the other hand,
encompassed all the right features for the acquisition of imperial greatness
and the historians presented it as a template to be applied in all times. In its
pursuit of empire by non-military methods, ruling out conquest from the
enterprise, the ever-growing British empire flourished through widespread
commerce and thus seemed to be proceeding on the right track that had once
been taken by Athens and had proven a success.
In his Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor points to the existence of a ‘battle
between two ethical outlooks’ in eighteenth-century Britain. The outcome of
this battle transpired in the form of ‘the rise of new valuation of [the] commer-
cial life’ and ‘the recession of the aristocratic honour ethic, which stressed
glory won in military pursuits’.33 In agreement with this argument, I would
further propose that one of the fields on which this battle between militaristic
and commercial attitudes in the culture was fought appeared to be the histories
of Ancient Greece. The former was represented by Sparta, the latter by Ath-
ens. The glory of Sparta seemed to be much tainted by its oppressive politics,
which became more visible in imperial questions. With liberty enshrined in its
legal code, its naval superiority, its excellence in commerce and its unwarlike
character, the imperial experience of Athens received positive remarks of the
sort that Sparta never did. The cause of this unbridgeable difference between
the empires of Sparta and Athens was, according to the historians, the con-
trasting characters of their legal systems.
As the eighteenth-century histories of Ancient Greece unfolded, one incli-
nation common to all the historians seems to have been their stress on the idea
that the inherent characteristics of the legal code of a state determined the fea-
tures of its imperial policy. As J.C.D. Clark has pointed out, ‘law, not party
politics, was the synthesizing intellectual genre of the late-eighteenth century
constitution’.34 The publication of the majority of the Ancient Greek histories
coincided with this shift to an appeal to law as the science of government. The
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IMPERIAL LESSONS FROM ATHENS AND SPARTA 653
particular reference to legal history by the philosophers of the Scottish Enlight-
enment resulted in the conviction that the history and political character of a
state could be understood through its legislation. The flaws in the politics of a
state could be explained by ‘the disparate and contradictory elements in its
legal system’.35 The stimulation of this understanding of law in the second
half of the eighteenth century inevitably made its way to these history texts.
Specifically, in contemporary theories of civilization and progress, a well-
established and just legal system was viewed as essential for refinement,
civilization and commerce.36 Otherwise authoritarianism, aggression and, as
the worst possible outcome, a despotic state with oppressive imperial policies
would result.
On account of this argument, the historians asserted that the defective char-
acter of the Spartan empire owed a great deal to the legal code of Lycurgos,
and thus underlined the effect of the legislative tradition at home on the
empire in the making. Within this context, Sparta came to the fore as the
Greek state with the most authoritarian laws that hardened not only its citizens
but also its attitude towards its colonies and neighbouring states. Undoubt-
edly, Lycurgos himself received remarks of approval from the historians.
Among them, Goldsmith, who considered Lycurgos as ‘one of the first and
most extraordinary legislators that ever appeared among mankind’,37 gave
him the most credit. From the perspective of empire, however, the legal code
of Lycurgos was not depicted in the histories as something to be emulated.
Lycurgos first encountered the problem of internal security and then resolved
to enhance Spartan government through laws and institutions whose ‘sever-
ity’, according to Leland, first transformed the Spartan people ‘into a robust,
hardy valiant nation, made for war’. But then, this warlike spirit of the Spar-
tans ‘under the appearance of a rigid discipline’, inspired ‘vast designs of
power’ and fuelled ‘an inordinate and violent ambition’.38 Such were the hall-
marks of the Spartan understanding of empire.
Throughout the eighteenth century, the threat of ever-growing Bourbon
strength disturbed ‘both ministers and the political nation in general’, making
them worry not only ‘about the strength and intentions of other powers’ but
also ‘about British vulnerability in face of them’.39 In this respect, the way the
British historians understood the imperial growth of Sparta by means of its
35 D. Lieberman, ‘The Legal Needs of a Commercial Society: The Jurisprudence of
Lord Kames’, in Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish
Enlightenment, ed. I. Hont and M. Ignatieff (Cambridge, 1983), p. 209.
36 See Hume, ‘That Politics may be Reduced to a Science’, in Essays, I, p. 105.
37 Goldsmith, Grecian History, I, p. 15. Also Stanyan, Grecian History, I, p. 85;
Hind, History of Greece, pp. 99–100; and Gast, Rudiments, p. 243.
38 Leland, Life and Reign of Philip, I, p. 22. Also Gillies, History of Ancient Greece,
I, p. 89.
39 J. Black, A System of Ambition? British Foreign Policy 1660–1793 (London and









































aggressive and expansionist policies resembled considerably eighteenth-
century apprehension of the French desire to challenge Britain both at home
and in North America. A military character was a feature never attributed to
Athens specifically within the context of imperial affairs. The Spartans, on
the other hand, were in Stanyan’s words ‘the only people in the world, to
whom war gave repose’. For them ‘the glory . . . was to be gained by dint of
fighting and in the open field’. Their ‘strict discipline’, acquired through
Lycurgos’s code of laws, bestowed on the Spartans a ‘moroseness of temper’,
and they extended to their colonies as well as to the neighbouring Greek states
‘the same harsh severity’.40 Additionally, in resemblance to how Spain and,
above all, France harassed the states of modern Europe in the name of build-
ing a universal monarchy, Sparta sought expansionism at the expense of its
neighbours. Gast, who wrote most straightforwardly on the issue of empire,
maintained that the Spartans’ ‘very virtues were the ruin of their unhappy
neighbours’.41
Needless to say, a constant quest for the military solution, in particular by
war on land, was not a policy held in high esteem in eighteenth-century Brit-
ain among those of a Tory frame of mind. First, this was the French way of
conducting foreign affairs and second, giving priority to ‘naval power and
colonial and commercial considerations’42 was seen as more feasible. The ‘in-
terventionist foreign policy’, likened to that of France, pursued during the
Whig supremacy, very much disturbed Tories and such discontent inevitably
echoed in the contemporary texts of Ancient Greek history which reflected a
Tory tendency. In this respect, despite being seen by the historians as the
archetype of monarchy in the Greek world, Sparta represented an undesirable
model for empire because of its unfailingly belligerent imperial policies.
According to the historians, if it was the belligerent character of the Spar-
tans that determined their aggressive imperial policies, the Athenian spirit of
liberty shaped the Athenian way of empire. Liberty was granted to the Athe-
nians through their legal system. The Athenian empire evolved in a beneficial
and praiseworthy way due to the legal code introduced by Solon.43 The first
Athenian attempts at colonization could be traced back to 600BC, which coin-
cided with the age of Solon. Having reinforced reforms of an unprecedentedly
broad scope covering almost all areas, Solon put an end, in the words of Gold-
smith, to ‘the inactive government’ of the times of the kings which lacked ‘the
spirit of extensive dominion’.44 The historians called the reader’s attention to
this point and argued that it was Solon’s comprehensive legislation that
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40 Stanyan, Grecian History, I, pp. 87–8. Also Gast, Rudiments, p. 266.
41 Gast, Rudiments, p. 266.
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43 Gillies, History of Ancient Greece, I, pp. 265, 453 and 455; and Jackson, Literature
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IMPERIAL LESSONS FROM ATHENS AND SPARTA 655
brought about wealth, greatness and eventually imperial success. Through
complete legislation, similar to that launched by Solon, a state would definitely
attain polished manners, profitable commerce, self-sufficient agricultural
production, security and wealth.45
Given the fact that the kind of legislation determined not only the type of
government, but the characteristics of the imperial policy of a state, Gillies
argued that, although conquest by definition had always to cause pain to the
conquered, the lands controlled by authoritarian Sparta ‘suffered still greater
vexations under the Spartan, than they had done under the Athenian
empire’.46 In acquiring new territories, the Spartans did not give priority to the
welfare of their colonies and remained fully committed to expanding their
empire.47 The ideal of mutual benefit between motherland and colonies was a
concept newly established in eighteenth-century Britain and was promoted in
some pamphlets as a wise policy for empire.48 Sparta was the type of empire
that disregarded such an ideal and gained the loyalty of subordinate states and
colonies through a scheme of oppression, ‘far from intending any benefit by
it’49 to them. Sparta, on this account, remained unattractive to the British his-
torians in their search for a more refined policy of empire, grounded in the
principle of mutuality.
Obviously, oppressive imperial policies required continual military action.
Given the contemporary dislike of engagement in a constant war on land, sig-
nificantly in the Tory camp, the Spartan empire appeared to be at odds with
the British understanding of empire, which was mainly mercantile, not milita-
ristic. In order to sustain the durability of their empire, the Spartans always
had to chase after ‘fresh occasions of war’,50 which stood as the ultimate
source of their imperial power. All in all, they maintained an atmosphere of
terror throughout their empire. The Spartans, apparently no different from the
Spanish and the French, were simply the most despicable sort of conquerors
‘who wield the sword, not of justice but of violence and oppression’.51 They
created a false solidarity which was destined to end as soon as the motherland
ceased to be formidable.
Conversely, Athens was viewed as qualified to teach imperial lessons. By
means of widespread commerce, naval power and polite manners, Athens
45 Mitford, History of Greece, I, p. 251; Gast, History of Greece, I, p. 257. Stanyan is
the only historian disagreeing with the superiority of Solon’s laws over those of
Lycurgos. Stanyan, Grecian History, I, p. 181.
46 Gillies, History of Greece, I, p. 398.
47 Gast, History of Greece, I, p. 398.
48 W. Baron, History of the Colonisation of the Free States of Antiquity applied to the
Present Contest between Great Britain and her American Colonies with Reflections
(London, 1777); T. Pownall, The Administration of the Colonies (London, 1765).
49 Gast, History of Greece, I, p. 494.
50 Goldsmith, Grecian History, I, p. 334.









































won the loyalty of its colonies and ensured that this attachment would be an
enduring one. The Athenian rulers safeguarded the prosperity and welfare of
‘all confederates’.52 In this way, Athens built a very profitable imperial net-
work that worked to mutual benefit. While Athens rejoiced at the flow of
wealth, as a result of sustained commerce with the colonies and neighbouring
states, and with the sense of security brought by dominance over Sparta and
Persia, the colonies and subordinate Greek states, in return, benefited not only
from trade with the motherland but also from the superior techniques intro-
duced by the Athenians to increase the efficiency of production, as well as
from the peace their alliance with Athens provided. Evidently, such an under-
standing of empire dovetailed with how many in the British political nation
perceived their own empire.
Among the imperial features of Athens which appeared to resemble those
of Britain most, naval superiority was of particular interest to the British
reader. The ideal of a maritime commercial empire and Britain’s suitability to
become one, preoccupied the political nation for centuries. According to the
perennial belief that supposedly originated in Ancient Rome, Britain by virtue
of being an island had a unique status. It was commonly pictured by its inhabit-
ants as isolated from the continent and eventually seemed in a position to
excel at maritime activities in order to maintain or surpass that isolation. One
can detect the varying reflections of this belief on British imperial policies in
different ages. In the sixteenth century, isolation was thought to be the reason
why the kingdom did not possess any overseas territories.53 In the eighteenth
century, however, the Tories made great play on this isolation as a part of their
propaganda against the Whig engagement in continental affairs at the expense
of maritime advancement. Investment in naval policies then appeared to be a
natural outcome of the isolated situation of Britain. The idea of a maritime
imperium, which had once stood for the sovereignty ‘solely over home
waters’, grew into something larger to include the ‘conception of mare
liberum on the oceans’, which led in turn to the advocacy of the blue-water
strategy of the eighteenth century.54
Looking at this picture, the traditional British notion of maritime dominion
accorded with the Athenian superiority on the seas, which was shared with no
other Ancient Greek state. In terms of security, for instance, the histories
established that Athenian maritime superiority eliminated the possibility of
invasion by sea altogether.55 Similarly, in imperial affairs, the benefits brought
by a powerful navy and exceptional skills in maritime activities were to be
greatly appreciated. Athens’ ‘very fair title to command at sea’ could not have
been challenged by Sparta, and this quality of Athens determined one of the
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IMPERIAL LESSONS FROM ATHENS AND SPARTA 657
essential differences between the two empires.56 On account of being a maritime
empire, Athens secured ‘a closer connection’ even with the most distant colo-
nies and was never ‘averse’ to expeditions far away.57 As such, naval strength
was presented by the historians as one of the requisites for connecting the
motherland to its offspring and building an unmilitaristic but robust empire
unlikely to dissolve easily.
By the end of the eighteenth century, the view became established in Brit-
ain that naval superiority served to foster commerce and that commerce
bound the colonies more tightly than the force of arms. The power of com-
merce had already proven superior to that of arms and was extensively
stressed by the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment. Though not peculiar to
this phase of British history, a favourable interest in commerce was an impor-
tant facet of the eighteenth-century imperial discourse.58 Also, the way the
thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment formulated it as the motor of civiliza-
tion added a new perspective to the British understanding of commerce. Com-
merce was ‘the parent of politeness’.59 Therefore both the quality and quantity
of commerce determined the level of civilization into which modern Europe
was expected to grow collectively.60 In a similar light, as an indicator of civili-
zation and a stimulator of refined manners, histories of Ancient Greece put
particular emphasis on the unmilitaristic and commercial characteristics of
the Athenian empire.
According to Gillies, the Athenians, excelling even the Romans, were the
only people in history who, ‘by the virtue of the mind alone, acquired an
extensive dominion over men equally improved with themselves in the arts of
war and government . . . an absolute authority in the islands of the Aegean, as
well as in the cities of the Asiatic coast’.61 Undoubtedly, the Athenian policy
of substituting commerce for military action enabled them to enjoy a secure
and peaceful hegemony over the states incorporated in the empire. Instead of
martial arts, the Athenians employed the ‘gentler arts of uprightness and
clemency which’, in Gast’s words, ‘alone are the security of governors, and
render empire amiable’.62
Still, of all the historians, Stanyan was the one who most explicitly stressed
this unmilitaristic aspect of the Athenians as another common point between
56 Stanyan, Grecian History, I, p. 327.
57 Gillies, History of Ancient Greece, I, p. 265.
58 J. Black, ‘British Foreign Policy in the Eighteenth Century: A Survey’, The Jour-
nal of British Studies, 26 (1987), pp. 26–53, p. 45.
59 J.G.A. Pocock, ‘Cambridge Paradigms and Scotch Philosophers: A Study of the
Relations between the Civic Humanist and the Civil Jurisprudential Interpretation of
Eighteenth-Century Social Thought’, in Wealth and Virtue, ed. Hont and Ignatieff,
p. 241.
60 See Hume, ‘Of the Jealousy of Trade’, in Essays, I, p. 348.
61 Gillies, History of Ancient Greece, II, p. 4.









































ancient Athens and contemporary Britain. He was convinced that commerce
flourished remarkably in Athens due to a similar environment to that of Brit-
ain. Through its virtues, the Athenian government spread ‘the love of labour
and husbandry’, which indeed ‘made way for commerce’ and put the Athe-
nians into a condition of ‘being rich at home and powerful abroad’. In combi-
nation with Solon’s laws of liberty, commerce at home helped ‘to tame and
polish a people bred up in liberty’. In imperial affairs, based on the principle
of profiting mutually, it stuck the motherland and its colonies together with a
glue more powerful than oppression, violence and force.63 For this reason,
above all others, Athens built up an empire inherently different from that of
Sparta, which pursued imperial goals through a ‘tyrannical government’ that
‘made use of empire only to oppress and subdue the rest of Greece’.64
The overt admiration felt towards the Athenian experience of empire, per-
vasive in the eighteenth-century histories of Ancient Greece, switched, how-
ever, to an easily detectable disenchantment when it came to the era of
Pericles. It was Pericles who redefined the imperial relations of Athens with
its periphery and referred to the empire, with the stronger term, arkhê, the
exercise of the power of beginning, in his Funeral Oration. Because the
empire at that time stretched ‘from Euxine to the sea of Crete from the coasts
of Asia to the Adriatic gulf’,65 the era of Pericles was commonly accepted as
the golden age of Athens. Nevertheless, the reader will not come across any
generous praise of Pericles by the British historians, because he undid all the
pacific accomplishments of Athens and brought about the later degeneration
of this once desirable model of empire. In his period, the imperial principle of
non-aggression, which had distinguished Athens from Sparta, was under-
mined. From Pericles’ rule onwards, Athens lost its previously amicable
voice and became the ‘dread’ of its colonies. What is more, while governing
the empire, Pericles put into force new regulations, in which the public benefit
was no longer a priority.66
Obviously, his role in the Peloponnesian War, as the one who declared war,
was the main reason why Pericles’ imperial ventures did not receive much
appreciation. Fighting a preventable war was certainly a sign of mismanage-
ment.67 The historians with Tory tendencies who demonstrated an anti-war
attitude in their works clearly disapproved of overzealous military expedi-
tions, which in fact meant the violation of the unofficial, unwritten imperial
code of Athens.
The historians equally disdained excessive expansion. To them, throughout
his reign Pericles breached not only the unofficial rule of non-aggression, but
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66 Ibid., pp. 379 and 377.









































IMPERIAL LESSONS FROM ATHENS AND SPARTA 659
the rule of optimal expansion as well. It was he who acquired more territory
than any other Athenian ruler, but his predecessor Cimon was nonetheless
saluted most dearly for his efficiency, wisdom and imperial genius. This
popularity of Cimon over Pericles among the British historians stemmed from
Pericles’ policy of overstretching the Athenian borders beyond the ideal
point, making it impossible for imperial governance to be free of fearfully
oppressive policies, degeneration and mismanagement.
In eighteenth-century Britain, hasty and spontaneous, hence not well-
planned, territorial expansion was dismissed by the political nation as a vain
and counterproductive pursuit of empire-building. This conviction was com-
monly expressed in contemporary political literature. At the beginning of the
century, D’Avenant, for example, explained the decline of both the Spanish
and Ottoman empires by the fact that they grew too fast, overstretched their
boundaries and while so doing they did not have ‘time to cement’ the compo-
nents of the empire.68 Therefore, expansion beyond the optimum point would
bring along with it maladministration, and the British who intended to learn
from history ought to resist the temptation of reckless expansion. As Nancy F.
Kohen maintains, the fear of ‘abundance’ also pervaded the imperial debate
of the early 1760s.69 This pamphlet debate reflected the anxiety about the new
territorial acquisitions which brought burdensome imperial obligations and
which required a change of the overseas administration.
Naturally therefore, overstretching the imperial borders was a concern also
shared by the historians. Although Pericles gloriously ruled over the most
extensive territory in the history of Ancient Athens, his ambition of expansion
rendered it impossible to govern the empire according to the maxims estab-
lished at the outset and enhanced afterwards by Cimon. As Gillies put it, what
the times of Pericles should have realized was that, consequent to his reign,
‘[i]n the exercise of power the Athenians displayed principles totally different
from those by which they had attained it’.70 Such a deterioration was what
would happen if the imperial capacity of a state were to be exceeded or, in
Gast’s words, if a state launched ‘the mad project of attempting the empire of
the world’. Unfortunately, the Athenians in the end undermined the ‘general
good’ of their empire and ‘in the name of protectors of Greece’ acted ‘in real-
ity’ as ‘its oppressors’. 71 The British, who were the ‘reluctant’ imperialists of
the eighteenth century, always had concerns that their empire might become
overextended. Whether an ever-expanding empire could be desirable or
affordable greatly preoccupied British statesmen of the time and evoked a
68 C. D’Avenant, An Essay upon Universal Monarchy (London, 1701), p. 52. Also
see Ferguson, Essay, p. 329.
69 N.F. Kohen, The Power of Commerce: Economy and Governance in the First Brit-
ish Empire (London, 1994), p. 171.
70 Gillies, Grecian History, I, p. 552. See also Montagu, Reflections, p. 144.









































substantial interest in the imperial experience of Athens, along with that of the
other ancient states. Thus they sought ways to surmount the challenges of
empire through, what Kohen calls, the ‘collective knowledge of imperial his-
tory’.72
Conclusion
All in all, in a scrutiny of the historiography of Ancient Greece produced in
eighteenth-century Britain and Ireland, empire comes to the fore as a theme
equal in importance to that of democracy. Taking only the question of democ-
racy into account, these texts may appear pro-Spartan, written with the pur-
pose of denouncing the evil forces of democracy and therefore Athens.
Nevertheless, ancient history-writing aimed to encompass many more paral-
lels that could be found in hotly contested contemporary problems that
required feasible solutions, and the writing of Ancient Greek history was no
exception. Therefore, picking up one theme and categorizing the entire histo-
riography in association with the investigation of that theme is not the way to
proceed. Instead, we should realize that the nature of the findings will differ
according to the theme chosen. I have thus attempted to argue that empire was
one of the political topics that much preoccupied the historians. With refer-
ence to that question, despite discontent with the reign of Pericles, Athens did
appear to be the desirable model, whereas Sparta provided only warnings. The
desirable model of empire, as presented by the eighteenth-century British and
Irish historians of Ancient Greece was maritime, commercial, non-expansionist
and hence non-aggressive. It established bonds of mutual benefit with the col-
onies. This pacific attitude towards the periphery depended a great deal on
honouring the correct legislative tradition at home. The historians dealt with
here put particular emphasis on these topics in the conviction that genuine
commitment to such principles would create the most durable empire on
earth.
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